

**THE RIGHT TO DIE WITH DIGNITY: A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY ON
ARUNA SHANBAUG V. UNION OF INDIA (2011)**

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ABSTRACT

The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011) marked a defining moment in India's right-to-die jurisprudence. The case raised complex constitutional, ethical, and medical questions surrounding passive euthanasia and the scope of Article 21. By examining Aruna Shanbaug's prolonged Persistent Vegetative State (PVS), the Court addressed whether the right to live with dignity includes the right to die with dignity. This commentary evaluates the Court's reasoning, distinctions between active and passive euthanasia, the safeguards established, and the judgment's limitations, particularly regarding advance directives. It also traces the decision's influence on subsequent jurisprudence, including Common Cause v. Union of India (2018). The paper argues that although cautious, the Aruna Shanbaug judgment laid foundational principles for end-of-life autonomy in India.

Keywords: Passive euthanasia, Article 21, right to die with dignity, PVS, judicial review, Aruna Shanbaug, medical ethics.

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INTRODUCTION

The constitutional debate surrounding the “Right to Die” has always been one of the most contested questions in India’s human rights discourse. Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, but whether this protection extends to the right to refuse life-prolonging treatment or to die with dignity has remained deeply debated. The discussion gained national attention with the case of ²*Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011)*, which forced the Supreme Court to revisit fundamental questions of dignity, autonomy, medical ethics, and the limits of judicial intervention.

Euthanasia particularly the distinction between active and passive euthanasia lies at the heart of the controversy. While active euthanasia involves a deliberate act to end life, passive euthanasia refers to withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, allowing nature to take its course. Before the *Aruna Shanbaug* decision, Indian law did not explicitly recognize either form, leaving end-of-life decisions in a legal vacuum.

The long and painful history of Aruna Shanbaug, who survived for decades in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) after a brutal assault, created moral and legal urgency. The case became a turning point by compelling the Court to address how constitutional dignity should operate in situations where the patient cannot express consent and where family or caregivers disagree.

This commentary critically analyses the legal, ethical, and constitutional dimensions of the judgment, its doctrinal foundations, subsequent influence, and its role in shaping India’s evolving right-to-die jurisprudence

BACKGROUND: LEGAL, ETHICAL & MEDICAL CONTEXT

³Globally, euthanasia has been debated for decades, with countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and certain U.S. states adopting varying degrees of legalization. These jurisdictions often differentiate between voluntary euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and passive withdrawal of treatment. International medical ethics increasingly recognize patient autonomy and the right to refuse extraordinary life-support measures, especially when continued treatment offers no meaningful possibility of recovery.

² *Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India*, (2011) 4 SCC 454 (India).

³ Benjamin P. Sachs, International Approaches to Euthanasia, 12 *Med. L. Rev.* 45 (2004).

Before *Aruna Shanbaug*, India's legal landscape was largely shaped by ⁴*Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab (1996)*, in which the Supreme Court held that the “right to die” is not a part of **Article 21**. The Court emphasized the sanctity of life and upheld Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code, which criminalized attempted suicide. However, *Gian Kaur* also left a conceptual opening by recognizing that the right to life includes the right to live with dignity until the end of natural life. This hinted at possible acceptance of passive euthanasia but did not operationalize it.

Ethically, India lacked a coherent legal or medical framework for dealing with terminal illness or PVS conditions. Families, doctors, and hospitals often operated in a grey zone without statutory safeguards, increasing the risk of misuse or uninformed decisions.

The petition in *Aruna Shanbaug* emerged nearly 38 years after Aruna's assault, highlighting the gap between medical reality and legal silence. As debates intensified about whether continuing artificial nutrition was meaningful or humane, the Supreme Court was compelled to intervene and set constitutional standards for future cases.

FACTS OF THE CASE

⁵Aruna Shanbaug was a young nurse working at KEM Hospital, Mumbai, when she was assaulted in 1973 by a ward boy who brutally strangled her with a dog chain and attempted to rape her. The attack cut off oxygen to her brain, leaving her in a **Persistent Vegetative State (PVS)** for the remainder of her life. For decades, she received basic nursing care from the hospital staff, who treated her as a member of their own family.

In 2009, activist and writer **Pinki Virani** filed a petition before the Supreme Court under ⁶**Article 32**, seeking permission to withdraw Aruna's artificial nutrition and hydration. Virani argued that keeping Aruna alive in such a state violated her dignity and prolonged meaningless suffering. However, the KEM Hospital staff strongly opposed the petition, asserting that Aruna was stable, not terminally ill, and that they had a moral duty to care for her.

This raised the key constitutional question: could passive euthanasia be permitted in India, and under what circumstances?

⁴ *Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab*, (1996) 2 SCC 648 (India).

⁵ Pinki Virani, *Aruna's Story* (1998).

⁶ *India Const.* art. 32.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The petition was filed directly before the Supreme Court under Article 32, seeking enforcement of Aruna's fundamental rights. Recognizing the gravity of the matter,⁷ the Court appointed a three-member medical board to examine Aruna's condition. The board confirmed that she was in a PVS but not brain-dead and exhibited certain basic reflexes.

The Court received contrasting views while Pinki Virani argued for withdrawal of life support, the hospital staff insisted on continuing care. The Supreme Court expanded the case from a personal medical request to a constitutional inquiry. It ultimately decided to frame guidelines for passive euthanasia in India, using its powers under Article 142 to fill the legislative vacuum.

ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

The Supreme Court identified several interrelated constitutional and ethical issues:

Primary Issue

Whether passive euthanasia can be legally permitted in India and, if so, under what safeguards.

Sub-Issues

1. **Does Article 21 include a “right to die with dignity”?** –

The Court had to interpret previous jurisprudence and decide the scope of dignity within the right to life.

2. **Whether withdrawal of life-support amounts to culpable homicide or merely “letting nature take its course.”**

3. **Who has legal authority to decide on behalf of an incapable patient?**

Should it lie with family members, doctors, caregivers, the State, or courts?

4. **How should autonomy be balanced against the sanctity of life?**

Especially in situations where the patient cannot express a living will.

5. **Should the Court create guidelines until Parliament enacts a law?**

This raised concerns about judicial law-making and separation of powers.

ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

Arguments by the Petitioner (Pinki Virani)

Pinki Virani argued that continuing Aruna's life under a state of irreversible Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) violated her right to die with dignity⁸, implicitly protected under Article 21. She

⁷ *Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug*, supra note 2.

⁸ Petitioner's Arguments, *Shanbaug*, supra note 2, at 471–72.

contended that Aruna was being kept alive artificially despite the absence of cognitive function or awareness, which amounted to medical futility. According to the petitioner, preserving biological life without the possibility of recovery served no purpose and amounted to cruelty. She highlighted that passive euthanasia was already practiced globally under strict conditions and urged India to adopt a humane and ethical approach. The withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, she argued, would not constitute active killing but merely allow Aruna's suffering to end naturally.

Arguments by Respondents (KEM Hospital & State Authorities)

The hospital staff emotionally opposed the petition,⁹ stating that they had cared for Aruna for 37 years and believed she was not in pain. They maintained that she was not terminally ill and that withdrawal of food would be equivalent to active killing, which is impermissible. The State also expressed concerns about possible misuse if euthanasia were legalized, especially in a country with socio-economic vulnerabilities. They argued that hospitals or families might exploit euthanasia for convenience or personal gain, particularly in cases involving elderly or disabled patients.

Thus, the respondents stressed caution and argued that such decisions should not be left solely to caregivers or distant activists.

THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT

In March 2011, the Supreme Court delivered its landmark judgment, making a crucial distinction between active and passive euthanasia. It held that **active euthanasia remains illegal in India**, as it would involve a deliberate act to cause death. However, **passive euthanasia withdrawal of life support—could be permitted under exceptional circumstances**, subject to strong procedural safeguards.

Safeguards Laid Down by the Court

The Court established a detailed regulatory framework:

1. **High Court approval is mandatory**, ensuring judicial oversight.
2. The case must be examined by a **bench of at least two judges**.
3. The High Court should appoint a **medical board consisting of three specialists**.

⁹ Respondents' Submissions, *id.* at 473.

4. Consent from the **patient’s parents, spouse, or next of kin** is required. In absence of family, the “surrogate decision-maker” may be the hospital or close caregivers.

Court’s Constitutional Reasoning

The Court held that Article 21 includes the right to live with dignity, and the dignity of a dying person is as important as the dignity of the living. The judgment relied heavily on international jurisprudence, especially the **UK decision in ¹⁰*Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland***, which permitted withdrawal of treatment for a PVS patient.

The Court concluded that continuing or withdrawing treatment should be viewed as a medical decision rather than homicide, provided it is supervised by the judiciary.

Outcome for Aruna Shanbaug

Despite laying down a legal framework supportive of passive euthanasia, the Court refused to grant it in Aruna’s case. It accepted the medical board’s view that she was stable and not brain-dead and acknowledged the long-standing emotional commitment of KEM staff. Thus, Aruna continued to receive care until her natural death in 2015.

DOCTRINAL & LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Article 21 & the Expansion of Dignity

The judgment significantly shaped the meaning of dignity under Article 21. Earlier, *Gian Kaur* held that the right to life does not include the right to die, but it hinted that the natural process of dying must still be dignified. *Aruna Shanbaug* builds upon this by affirming that “dignity” does not end at the threshold of life but permeates the dying process. This interpretation aligns with the broader constitutional trend especially seen later in ¹¹*Puttaswamy* which sees autonomy and bodily integrity as core components of Article 21.

B. Distinction Between Active and Passive Euthanasia

The Court accepted the philosophical and ethical distinction between killing and letting die. Passive euthanasia, in the Court’s view, is not an act of homicide but an acknowledgment of medical futility. Globally, medical ethics recognizes that withholding treatment in irreversible conditions respects the natural process of dying. The Court’s reliance on *Airedale* demonstrates an acceptance of the “best interest of the patient” standard.

¹⁰ *Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland*, [1993] AC 789 (HL) (UK).

¹¹ *K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India*, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (India).

However, critics argue that this distinction can be morally ambiguous, as withdrawal of hydration in PVS cases may still involve suffering. Nevertheless, the Court followed prevailing global standards to create an ethical balance.

C. Judicial Law-Making & Legislative Vacuum

One of the most significant criticisms of the judgment revolves around judicial law-making. The Supreme Court essentially formulated guidelines similar to the ¹²**Vishaka framework**, to operate until Parliament enacts an appropriate law. While critics described this as judicial overreach, the Court justified it as a necessity in situations where life, liberty, and medical rights were at stake. Given the legislative vacuum and India's lack of end-of-life laws, the Court's intervention can also be viewed as a constitutional safeguard.

D. Safeguards Against Misuse

India's socio-economic inequality necessitated a cautious approach. The Court recognized that elderly and disabled persons may be vulnerable to coercion. Thus, requiring High Court approval, medical boards, and a structured review prevents rash decisions and protects the patient from exploitation. These safeguards reflect a realistic understanding of Indian social dynamics.

E. Weaknesses & Criticisms

Despite its progressive approach, the judgment had limitations:

- **Autonomy was not prioritized**, because Aruna's own wishes were unknowable. The Court relied more on the sentiments of caregivers rather than any legal principle of substituted judgment.
- **Overemphasis on the hospital's emotional bond** was criticized. Many scholars argue that the decision reinforced paternalism rather than autonomy.
- **Failure to recognize Advance Medical Directives** (Living Wills) was a major gap. This issue was corrected only later in *Common Cause* (2018).
- The judicial procedure designed by the Court is often too slow for real-time medical decisions.

Nevertheless, the judgment laid crucial groundwork for later reforms and constitutional clarity.

¹² *Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan*, (1997) 6 SCC 241 (India).

IMPACT AND SUBSEQUENT JURISPRUDENCE

A. Immediate Impact

The *Aruna Shanbaug* judgment made India one of the few countries to judicially recognize passive euthanasia, albeit conditionally. It provided medical professionals with a framework for end-of-life decisions and ensured that withdrawal of life support would not expose them to criminal liability when undertaken with judicial approval.

B. Influence on Later Cases

1.¹³ *Common Cause v. Union of India* (2018)

The most significant evolution occurred when a Constitution Bench revisited euthanasia law in *Common Cause*. The Court affirmed that the right to die with dignity is an integral part of Article 21. It legalized **Living Wills/Advance Medical Directives**, allowing competent individuals to specify future treatment preferences in the event of loss of capacity. This marked a major shift towards patient autonomy, correcting the primary limitation of the *Aruna* judgment.

The 2018 decision expanded the concept of dignity by recognizing the personal choice involved in declining life-prolonging treatment.

2. *Medical & Ethical Reforms*

Following the *Aruna* ruling, many hospitals began developing end-of-life care policies. It encouraged discussions within the Indian medical community about ethical decision-making, palliative care, and patient rights. Professional medical bodies started advocating for guidelines and training for physicians dealing with terminal care.

C. Legislative Debates

The judgment triggered debates on whether India needs a comprehensive euthanasia law similar to European models. Concerns remain regarding misuse, especially among impoverished families who might withdraw treatment due to financial strain. Additionally, India's limited palliative care infrastructure raises questions about whether patients truly have freedom of choice. Nevertheless, the judgment succeeded in opening space for legislative reform, ethical discourse, and more humane medical practices.

ETHICAL & POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Euthanasia raises profound ethical dilemmas. Autonomy is a central value, but it must be balanced with the sanctity of life. For patients in PVS who cannot express their wishes, decision-

¹³ *Common Cause v. Union of India*, (2018) 5 SCC 1 (India).

making becomes more complex. There is always a risk that caregivers or institutions may prioritize convenience, financial pressures, or emotional fatigue over the patient's best interests.

¹⁴India's socio-economic realities further complicate the issue. With limited access to quality palliative care and high treatment costs, passive euthanasia could be misused if not carefully regulated. Cultural and religious beliefs also play a role, as many Indian traditions emphasize the moral duty to preserve life.

The need for a clear legislative framework remains urgent. Comprehensive laws should define decision-making authority, protect vulnerable patients, recognize advance directives, and ensure medical accountability. Policies must also expand palliative care services, ensuring that euthanasia is a considered choice rather than the result of medical neglect or financial desperation.

CONCLUSION

The *Aruna Shanbaug* judgment represents a defining moment in India's constitutional journey. It balanced compassion with caution, acknowledging the possibility of passive euthanasia while insisting on rigorous safeguards. Although the Court did not allow passive euthanasia in Aruna's own case, it laid down a legal framework that shaped future jurisprudence.

The decision marked the beginning of India's shift from viewing life as mere biological survival to understanding it in terms of dignity and autonomy. It paved the way for the more liberal and autonomy-focused decision in *Common Cause* (2018), where living wills were recognized and the right to die with dignity was clearly affirmed. Ultimately, *Aruna Shanbaug* exemplifies how constitutional interpretation evolves alongside societal values, medical developments, and ethical reflection. By recognizing the importance of a dignified death, the judgment strengthened Article 21 as a guardian of not only life but also humane and meaningful living until its natural end.

¹⁴ Sudhir K. Shah, End-of-Life Care in India, 22 *Indian J. Med. Ethics* 113 (2015).